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WEST VIRGINIA LAW
were held to be a provocation; and also that knowledge of the deceased's sexual intercourse with the deceased's wife was held to be
a provocation even though the accused did not obtain the knowledge by seeing the act of sexual intercourse or any circumstances
relating to such act. It would seem that knowledge of such act
should be held to be a provocation that could reduce murder to
manslaughter no matter whether that knowledge is obtained by
seeing or hearing, for the effect of the knowledge would surely
be the same in either case. It is the law that touching a person
under such circumstances as reasonably to arouse the passions of
an ordinary man is such provocation, 29 C. J. § 120, p. 1137, and
such a touching may consist of tweaking the nose, filliping on the
forehead, or spitting in the face, State v. Grugin, supra, citing,
K nuy, ChimINIL LAW, § 518. By analogy therefore it would follow that the circumstances of this case would be at least as likely
to arouse that "hot blood" which reduces murder to manslaughter
as tweaking the nose, filliping on the forehead, or spitting in the
face. Hence, it is submitted that this case is one where the circumstances were such as would naturally or reasonably arouse the
passions of an ordinary man beyond his power of self-control, and
therefore it should be held, upon principle, that in a situation like
this there is sufficient provocation to reduce the crime of murder
to manslaughter.
-C. M. C.
EVDENCEL-CONTRACTS--CUSTOM

AND

USAGES--CONTRADICTION

OF STATUTORY DEFINITION BY TRADE USAGE OR SPECIAL CONTRACT.-

Chapter 59, § 27 Barnes, West Virginia Code, 1923, provides
that "A ton shall contain two thousand pounds." P orally contracted to mine coal for D for a certain price per ton, nothing being said as to the weight of a ton. P mined coal for some time and
then notified D of a change in price and stated that the price would
be so much, per gross ton. P continued to mine coal for D and D
paid P on gross ton basis of 2,240 pounds. P"contends that he
was employed on a net ton basis of 2,000 pounds, and brought an
action for the balance of the account. D offers evidence to prow
custom among mines to mine coal on gross ton basis of 2,240
pounds. Judgment for P as to balance of account before notice
of change in price (it being held that the coal mined after notice
of change of rate to a certain price per gross ton was done under
a special contract). Held, in absence of special contract, statutory
definition controls and no evidence of custom will be admitted to
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attach any other meaning to it. Buchanan v. Louisville Coal &
Coke Co., 127 S. E. 335 (W. Va. 1925).
This is apparently the first time that this exact question has
been before the West Virginia court but the precise question was
before the Pennsylvania court and the same result was reached.
Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431, 6 Atl. 354. Similar
cases, but in which the element of special contract did not enter,
have been before several other courts, and it is held that if a
statute has given a definite meaning to any particular word no
evidence of custom will be admitted to attach any other meaning
to it. Dwight & Lloyd Co. v. American Ore Co., 263 Fed. 315;
Green v. Moffett, 22 Mo. 529; Rogers v. Allen, 47 N. H. 529. Evidence of general or universal customs applicable to the trade or
business is admissible if it is shown that such customs must be
used in the interpretation of the contract. Universal customs
applicable to trade are binding unless there is notice that the
contract is without regard to the custom. Richardson v. Cornforth, 118 Fed. 325; Morris v. Supple, 208 Pa. 257, 57 Atl. 566;
Louisiana Red Cypress Co. v. Gilmore, 70 S. E. 379 (Ga.) ; it is
not necessary to show that party knew of the custom, for a party
is presumed to have entered into the contract with reference to
any existing general usage or custom relating to such business.
Steidtman v. Joseph Lay Co., 234 Ill. 84, 84 N. E. 640; U. S. Continental Coal Co. v. Birdsell, 108 Fed. 882; Anderson v. Lewis,
64 W. Va. 297, 61 S. E. 160. Custom contrary to statute is invalid. Deadwyler & Co. v. Karow & Forrer,131 Ga. 227, 62 S. E.
172; Swift & Co. v. U. S., 105 U. S. 691; Colgate v. Pa. Co., 102
N. Y. 120. It is well settled that contracts contrary to statutes
are invalid. 13 C. J. 420 and cases cited. These principles
of law and citation of authority lead one to ask the following
question in regard to the principal case. Has the statute given
a definite meaning to the word "ton," so that whenever it is used
it shall mean 2,000 pounds? It, of course, depends upon the interpretation of the statute. "It is a familiar rule that a thing may
be within the letter, and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers. Hence,
the interpretation of the whole will control the interpretation of
its parts." Church of Holy Trinity v. U. S., 143 U. S. 457, 12
Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226. Looking at chapter 59 as a whole it
would seem that it was the intention of the legislature to provide
for a uniform standard of weights and measures insofar as to
provide for inspecting and ascertaining if correct, all weights and
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QUARTERLY

measures, and to seal those that are correct and to condemn those
that are inaccurate, in order to protect the public from being
defrauded by inaccurate weights and measures. So it would seem
that the legislature did not intend to give the word "ton" a definite meaning so that whenever it was used it would mean 2,000
pounds. The fact that the court admits that special contract,
showing that the parties contracted upon the basis of another
standard, would prevail over the statute, would seem to indicate
that the court thought that the legislature had not given a definite
meaning to the word "ton," for a contract contrary to statute
is invalid. So it is submitted that if upon a very broad construction of the statute, it is held that the statute gives a definite
meaning to the word "ton," so that whenever it is used it shall
mean 2,000 pounds and that evidence of usage to the contrary
is inadmissible, it would seem to follow that evidence of a special
contract would be inadmissible. But if, on the other hand, the
statute is not so broadly construed, but with a view as to what
the legislature intended, which seems to be that the legislature had
not given a definite meaning to the word "ton" and which the
court virtually admits on the one hand by holding that a special
contract would govern,.then it would seem that evidence of custom
as well as of a special contract would be admissible. (Case also
commented on in 39 Harvard Law Review 122).

-W. P. L.
EVIDENCE-RIGHT OF PRESIDING JUDGE TO ASK LEADING QUES-

TIONS OR To TEsTFY.-In

a prosecution for retailing liquor with-

out having paid the special tax therefor, the defendant denied all
the charges. The presiding judge then asked certain leading
questions which elicited the fact of an extra-judicial conference
with the judge in which the defendant made statements amounting
to an admission. Exception. Held, the interrogation by the
judge was in effect the same as testimony by him and was therefore reversible error. Terrell v. United States, 6'FED. (d) 498.
It is generally held that a presiding judge may not testify in
a case unless he descends from the bench and another is appointed
in his stead to conduct the trial. Rogers v. State, 60 Ark. 76, 29
S. W. 894; People v. Dohring, 59 N. Y. 374; III WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1909. But did the court in the principal case testify?
His questioning achieved the same result as would his testimony
from the stand, but the testimony itself all came from the witness.
If the same questions had been asked by counsel the objection, if
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